An examination of the identity theory of the mind
Identity theory sociology
Thus the proprioception which constitutes consciousness, as distinguished from mere awareness, is a higher order awareness, a perception of one part of or configuration in our brain by the brain itself. Martin, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Attempts at Salvaging Type Identity Since the publication of Putnam's paper, a number of philosophers have tried to save Mind-Brain Type Identity from the philosophical scrapheap by making it fit somehow with the claim that the same mental states are capable of being realized in a wide variety of life-forms and physical structures. Kripke calls an expression a rigid designator if it refers to the same object in every possible world. The representation might be like a map. See Mary's room page for full discussion. We find out whether this is a table in a different way from the way in which we find out that it is an old packing case. An example is the way the pain of jarring ones elbow feels to the individual. Perhaps I am not one hundred percent on automatic pilot. Historical Antecedents The identity theory as I understand it here goes back to U.
It is natural to feel that there is something ineffable about which no mere neurophysiological process with only physical intrinsic properties could have. This sentence also is neutral as to whether the properties of the sensation are physical or whether some of them are irreducibly psychical.
If I report the occurrence of a pain in my leg, then the story goes I must have a pain in my leg. The representation might be like a map.
Kirk, R. Still, suppose that heat has an essence and that it is molecular motion, or at least is in the context envisaged. This is not to the point but there is a point behind it.
Token identity theory
Smart came to agree with this. Whether Endicott's considerations constitute a sufficient defense of the disjunctive strategy is still open to debate. Sellars eds. His views on dispositions are argued at length in his debate with Armstrong and Martin Armstrong, Martin and Place, T. It is to retain a type-type mind-brain identity theory, but allow that that the identities between mental types and brain types may—indeed, most likely will—need to be restricted. Criticism and replies[ edit ] Main article: Multiple realizability One of the most influential and common objections to the type identity theory is the argument from multiple realizability. Kim, Jaegwon Broad, C. The mind-body correlations as formulated at present, do not admit of spatial correlation, so they reduce to matters of simple correlation in time. The worry expressed by Smart is that if there were non-physical qualia there would, most implausibly, have to be laws relating neurophysiological processes to apparently simple properties, and the correlation laws would have to be fundamental, mere danglers from the nomological net as Feigl called it of science. Seeking an alternative to the classic dualist position , according to which mental states possess an ontology distinct from the physiological states with which they are thought to be correlated, Place claimed that sensations and the like might very well be processes in the brain—despite the fact that statements about the former cannot be logically analyzed into statements about the latter. Armstrong's central state materialism involved identifying beliefs and desires with states of the brain a.
In fact, the mind-brain identity theory stands in contrast to all other philosophies in the category of mind-body dualism, which contends that the mind and body are distinct and different substances.
Whether Endicott's considerations constitute a sufficient defense of the disjunctive strategy is still open to debate.
Mind/brain identity theory quizlet
However even so he should have admitted it in folk psychology and also in scientific psychology and biology generally, in which physics and chemistry are applied to explain generalisations rather than strict laws. If wind and weather pushed the aeroplane off course then negative feedback would push the aeroplane back on to the right course for Sydney. Martin, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Mind-brain identity theory vs. Pettit , pp. Later Objections to the Identity Theory Mention should here be made of influential criticisms of the identity theory by Saul Kripke and David Chalmers respectively. The dispute between identity theorists and physicalists generally and Chalmers comes down to our attitude to phenomenology. This appeals to our intuitions, but perhaps we could reverse the argument and say that because the robot can be aware of its awareness the robot is conscious. Merrill eds. Different philosophers took this proposal to imply different things. There are teleological and homuncular forms of functionalism, which I do not consider here. For one thing I might be absent minded and thinking about philosophy.
It has been claimed, for example, that because people have had and still do have knowledge of specific mental states while remaining ignorant as to the physical states with which they are correlated, the former could not possibly be identical with the latter. And conversely, while brain states may be spatially located with a fair degree of accuracy, it has traditionally been assumed that mental states are non-spatial.
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